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 The Strategic Landscape: Avoiding Future Generations of 
Violent Extremists 
by Kathleen Meilahn 
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
This article addresses the global environment, with a specific focus on U.S. Central Command’s 
(USCENTCOM’s) Area of Operations (AOR), and it contemplates the question: How can we 
avoid losing the next generation to Violent Extremists (VE)? It focuses on Islamic VEs, both Sunni 
and Shi’ia, addresses the Human Terrain and seeks to identify individual’s personal motivations. 
This article does not state official USCENTCOM policy or opinions. 
Today, the United States’ primary national security challenge centers around a problem that, 
should we “get it wrong,” will have transcendent implications. Terrorism and violence have 
plagued humankind throughout history, but now the world finds itself at yet another critical 
juncture. The terror challenge is the nexus of a multiplicity of issues that lead toward it, like the 
spokes on a wheel lead from the rim to the hub. Alternatively, terrorist vision can inform a 
multiplicity of issues and lead outward toward the rim, out to where the rubber meets the road. 
In contrast to ongoing efforts to understand the enemy’s extremist theological ideology, there has 
been less energy devoted to understanding the radicalization process or to understand what 
leads individuals to become radicalized and act out in violence or terror, or to understand the 
impact of U.S. foreign policy on this radicalization process. 
Psycho-social and political factors play an important role in radicalization. Where Islamist Violent 
Extremist Organizations (VEO) are concerned, these factors play a significant role in 
recruitment—versus just theology. However, once recruited, theology becomes the justification 
for violent actions. In the initial stages of al-Qaeda’s ascendancy, theological values that became 
politically radicalized were a driving factor motivating the core actors. As al-Qaeda (AQ) and other 
VEOs aim to increase in size, their recruitment process has become more oriented toward—or 
broadened to include—political issues, and those foot soldiers who volunteer are often psycho-
socially motivated. Yet, in effect, AQ is “engaged in an unprecedented exercise of corrupting, 
misinterpreting and misrepresenting the word of God to generate support for their political 
mission.”[1] 
“Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of the radicalization process.”  
–Silber and Bhatt, NYPD, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. 
Al-Qaeda, the primary Violent Extremist Organization of immediate concern to USCENTCOM, 
purports a global ideology, but participants join for a variety of personal or more localized reasons. 
The same dynamics apply to participants of violent organizations such as smaller AQ Network 
(AQN) groups, the Taliban (TB), and a plethora of insurgent or militant groups in Iraq and 
throughout the region. These local organizations are often grassroots movements that “fly the 
flag” of global violent extremist ideology in order to gain perceived legitimacy, funding and 
material support. Thus, when thinking about groups or individuals, their intention provides clarity 
which will guide both understanding of motivations and help define solutions. While insurgencies 
are political movements that desire a change in policies, terrorism is a violent, fear-producing 
method to force change in an environment.[2] 
If USCENTCOM is interested in focusing in on global VEOs such as al-Qaeda, the first step 
toward deterring their ascendancy is to understand the individuals involved at all levels of the 
organization. Thus, it is essential to identify the different populations and their varied motivations, 
religious ideological or political. This will enable USCENTCOM to identify means available to 
diminish AQ’s political-religious legitimization.  
The tipping point for the individual occurs when, seeing no other recourse for redress of 
grievances, he becomes radicalized. VEO ascendancy occurs when the radicalized individuals 
are motivated to join the jihad as the only available means to express opposition, and is solidified 
when the recruit begins to actually commit to the organization’s stated ideology. 
Who are Violent Extremists? 
Broadly, Violent Extremists fall in to one of the following categories: insurgents, militia, global 
totalitarian radicals (such as al-Qaeda), religious nationalists (such as the Taliban), and their 
associated volunteers (mujahedeen, the foot soldiers). Violent Extremists are individuals who 
have been radicalized. Many have experienced a specific life event or “dark epiphany” that led 
them to engage in violent acts, while others have been psycho-socially groomed or manipulated, 
and still others have personal reasons to turn to martyrdom, violence or terror. Some are enacting 
a displaced social protest, and some participate in order to simply make a living. Just as terrorist 
motivations are diverse, so are their educational and social backgrounds, but they are generally 
united by a need to see oneself as good and heroic, esteemed by the community and blessed by 
God (which is, in essence, preservation of the self image).[3] 
Politically Radicalized Muslims 
The 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted among more than 17,000 people in 17 
countries, found that while many Muslims believe that radical Islam poses a threat, there are 
differing opinions as to its causes. Sizable minorities in most predominantly Muslim countries 
point to poverty, joblessness and a lack of education, but pluralities in Jordan and Lebanon cite 
U.S. policies as the most important cause of Islamic extremism.[4] 
A 2005-2006 Gallup Poll representing over 90 percent of the Muslim world determined that 7 
percent of the population fits in the “politically radicalized” category—those who both felt the terror 
attacks of 9/11 were “completely justified,” and who have an “unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” 
view of the United States. However, these people were not necessarily interested in acting out 
violently as a result of their opinions. In fact, they were more likely than mainstream Muslims to 
say that “moving toward greater democracy will help Arab/Muslim societies progress,” possibly 
indicating a generalized, underlying desire of the politically radicalized for greater self-
determination in all aspects of their life. If this is the case, then solving issues that are politically 
frustrating to Muslims is a significant aspect of the solution toward preventing transition toward 
violence within that population. 
“Ideology is not the motivation for terrorism but is a radicalizing factor in that it provides the moral 
justification for engaging in killing, suicide and destruction.”  
–Gallup  
These same individuals often cited “occupation and U.S. domination”[5] as their greatest fear for 
their country, indicating U.S. foreign policy as an important concern. They also expressed fear 
that the United States would not allow them to fashion their own political future, and they doubted 
U.S. intentions or seriousness about supporting democracy in the region. This group felt that the 
West should respect Islam and stop imposing its beliefs and policies or interfering in internal 
affairs of predominately Muslim states, suggesting a generalized apprehension over Western 
threats to the Islamic way of life. The politically radicalized have a sense of urgency to protect 
their cultural identity, something which often leads to apocalyptic activity.[6] They are also more 
likely than mainstream Muslims to say it is “completely justifiable” to sacrifice one’s life for a 
cause one believes in.[7] These are the individuals and issues that the United States, her allies 
and partners must confront to prevent conversion of radicalized political sentiment into violent 
action. 
Theological and Doctrinal Underpinnings 
There is no universally accepted Muslim doctrine with regard to violent jihad and terrorism, and 
Islamic precepts can also be used by mainstream Muslims promoting peace. Many of those 
polled by Gallup, for example, who condemned terrorism did so for humanitarian or religious 
reasons. One respondent paraphrased Qur’anic sura 5:32, saying “Killing one life is as sinful as 
killing the whole world.” 
The major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi’ia, as well as other movements or sects, follow 
varied belief systems and schools of thought on theological law.[8] Accordingly, the radicalized al-
Qaeda “brand” rhetoric of Usama bin Laden (UBL) is not necessarily heeded by all Muslims, nor 
is it perceived as legitimate by members of other sects. This provides an opportunity, though 
challenging, to ideologically counter Violent Extremists using Islamic precepts.  
Al-Qaeda tells its recruits that Islamic sacred scriptures and laws authored directly by God very 
clearly prescribe warfare and violence as a means to achieve an ultimate religious purpose, 
especially when such a war can be defined as defensive. In the case of Iraq, for example: it can 
fairly readily be defined as invasion by persons in the Middle East, has been defined by the UN 
as an occupation, and has been admitted by the Administration to be a pre-emptive strike. For 
many Iraqi extremists, they are putting up what they perceive to be a resistance—a defense 
against an invasion or an occupation. Considering the divine nature of these Islamic prescriptions, 
al-Qaeda in Iraq says, it is a “supreme” Muslim obligation to wage jihad against the United States 
and her allies because the coalition presently meets every prerequisite for Muslims to fulfill the 
obligation for jihad. Thus, in this case, U.S. foreign policy and its global communications 
regarding related events played directly into the hands of al-Qaeda. 
Usama bin Laden took a strategic decision to wage jihad against the “far enemy first”—something 
considered to be a revolutionary concept. His goal to facilitate rapid globalization of the al-Qaeda 
“brand” of ideology has required AQ to become a network of veritable franchises in order to 
encourage expansion. However, not all Violent Extremists, nor all Muslims, have interest in a 
world-wide caliphate. In fact most Shi’ia would not accept a Sunni leader of the ummah, “of all 
Muslims worldwide,” presenting a division within Islam. This will likely lead to future internal 
conflict as the primarily Sunni al-Qaeda strives toward its globalized goals. Other VEOs, such as 
the Taliban, have specific local aspirations with local political and economic goals. Similarly, 
franchises often carry the AQ brand name in order to achieve legitimacy while they strive to 
achieve their own local political and economic goals. 
“We must not fail…to distinguish between the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and 
mainstream Muslim believers.”  
–David F. Forte  
Violent Extremist Organizations (from al-Qaeda to the Taliban to traditional insurgencies) use 
violence in order to influence politics. They are smaller, less well armed or equipped, less salient 
but more motivated groups that face a larger, more powerfully armed government and are thus 
forced to utilize unconventional tactics and strategies. In the case of the Taliban before 2006, 
they were an instrument of Pakistani policy, and sometimes U.S. policy and Saudi Arabian policy. 
The language of ideology was a cover, providing something around which to rally, a veritable flag 
to fly (as was the language of communist ideology during the Cold War, when insurgencies 
worldwide claimed to be “communist” to obtain legitimacy and material or financial support). 
Today, acts of terrorism rely on media amplification to achieve maximum psychological effect and 
thus achieve grandiose narcissistic affirmation for the organization and its leaders. Audiences for 
these efforts include their targets of violence, sympathizers, sources of funding, and potential 
recruits. 
Al-Qaeda is expert at marketing. It has successfully framed the purported struggle against the 
United States in emotional narratives that link Muslim suffering and humiliation to what is 
portrayed as the collusion of apostate Muslim leaders with Western oppressors who are seeking 
to destroy Islam and subjugate Muslim lands. This has also provided the psychological relief to 
allow radicalized Muslims to deactivate their own self-inhibiting norms against murder and 
mayhem, allowing them to claim the status of moral agents—even when they are acting in un-
Islamic ways. It is worth analyzing other prevalent Muslim narratives that can be upheld in lieu of, 
or to counter, al-Qaeda’s narrative, but that is another subject for another paper. 
Violent Extremist Leaders and Lieutenants 
Violent Extremist leaders and lieutenants are, like fascists and Marxist-Leninists in their days, 
highly competent, motivated and ambitious. They are often middle class, educated, and idealistic. 
Politically disenfranchised individuals who sometimes exhibit cult-leader psychological qualities, 
they could be psychopaths, but are certainly fanatics with a deep sense of commitment to a 
political agenda. Such ideological millenarians are uncompromising and see a survival issue;[9] 
their political disenfranchisement is culturally motivated in the sense that Western policies and 
values are perceived as compromising the extremist’s values, the sovereignty of his nation, and 
the assumed role of Islam in the world.  
Lieutenants come from a largely engineering-scientific academic background, and tend to be 
challenged with a lack of professional opportunities, a feeling of relative deprivation and frustrated 
expectations.[10] Many families in the AOR pressure their children to study these subjects as 
they are perceived to be good career paths and little other options are known, whether it is of 
interest to the student or not. Thus the job market is flooded with these people, resulting in a deep 
frustration and anger when they dislike their profession and also face few opportunities.[11] 
Islamic Violent Extremist leaders, especially al-Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL), stem from 
disillusioned intelligentsia in more developed countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt and are 
influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and ideas of Sayyid Qutb.[12] Disillusionment over the 
decline of Arab/Muslim influence in the geopolitics of the world and the failure of pan-Arabism is 
viewed with an eye to failure of other systems such as communism and Marxism. It is also 
considered against a backdrop of perceived failure of democracy in the Middle East and 
perceived moral and ethical corruption in Western democracies. These politically and culturally 
disenfranchised individuals suffer a poverty of dignity.[13] They desire a return to Islamic roots 
and are looking for a new way to find Arab/Muslim success in the world. 
Foot Soldiers 
Violent Extremist volunteers are often drawn from uneducated and economically downtrodden 
classes, and usually their motivation to act results from the United States, or the West, being 
implicated in the creation of their problems, and the inaccessibility of non-violent forms of dissent. 
In the social context of the Middle East and south central Asia, bearing of arms is considered to 
be an honorable profession, thus it provides not only a form of dissent but also a means by which 
to achieve respect, honor and income. For some, cultural factors such as revenge, or a desire to 
become a martyr to make up for personal sins, are the real reasons they engage in violent activity. 
In these cases, theology is merely the excuse and rallying point to join the larger group. 
Children and youth residing in war-torn or conflict ridden countries have the potential to become 
Violent Extremists; anti-U.S., anti-Western or even anti-local-government insurgents. Those who 
are psychologically susceptible to cult-like influence will become tomorrow’s martyrs unless 
actions are taken to eliminate circumstances creating vulnerability. A generation of fighters exists 
who know no other skills (thus, have no legitimate work skills), and to complicate matters many 
small businesses fold because they are unable to operate without reliable electric or alternative 
energy sources. Thus, many adults are involved in nefarious activities because they see no other 
options. Poor economic, energy and governance environments provide the fertile ground in which 
the seed of extremist ideology will grow, if not otherwise nipped in the bud. 
Hassan Ali, sociologist at the Iraq Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs estimates at least 1 million 
kids have seen their lives damaged by the war—“these children will come to believe in the 
principles of force and violence…”  
–“Iraq’s Young Blood” by Christian Caryl, Newsweek, January 22, 2007  
Ongoing violence has destroyed the social fabric that once provided a safety net, and created a 
generation of undereducated,[14] unemployed, traumatized, and vengeful boys and girls 
receptive to appeals of militias and insurgent or terrorist groups that give them a new sense of 
belonging. Examples: Ali Sadkhan, a 14 year old Shi’ia from Karbala says he is grateful to the 
Mahdi Army for “making a man out of me” and he is ready to stand against “the evil of 
America.”[15] Following the Red Mosque incident, a fifteen year old girl said “I was at the 
madrassa to study religion”…”But after what the government did, this has given us the idea of 
being martyrs.”[16] 
Some children are born into circumstances supportive to becoming a Violent Extremist (such as 
in Taliban-ridden provinces of Afghanistan and Pakistan) or into cults of martyrdom (such as 
Hizb’Allah in Lebanon or Hamas in the Palestinian Territories) where they respond to societal 
glorification of martyrdom. Thus, many at a very young age are willing to make the ultimate 
sacrifice of martyrdom, a decision which is clearly not motivated by economics or politics or even 
theology as much as an ingrained belief system imposed upon them. Many receive an 
“education” that consists of psycho-social manipulation (brain-washing) similar to what is 
conducted by cults. The madrassas offer not only spiritual inspiration, but also economic 
advantages—they provide room and board as well as what is perceived as an honorable 
theology-based education for children of poor families, or for orphans. 
Children in war torn societies may be less likely to become Violent Extremists if they are given 
better alternatives. Stability and Reconstruction activities are effective tools to create an 
environment counter to that which breeds Violent Extremists. This is best conducted by the local 
governments, but can be successful with assistance of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
Civil-military activity, interagency cooperation with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
subcontracted NGOs on reconstruction projects such as alternative energy sources, schools and 
medical clinics, job creation, or other endeavors leading toward reduction of poverty have the 
potential to provide a long term solution to the problem—if redevelopment efforts by the United 
States and the international community are properly managed. 
Keeping children out of extremist clutches is an issue in Pakistan, where largely inaccessible and 
problematic madrassas reside inside entire swaths of territory controlled by de facto rule which 
keeps legitimate security forces and governance at bay. The militants have used children for 
fighting and for propaganda purposes, even releasing a video showing a very young looking boy 
hacking off the head of a hostage (which presents itself to the United States and coalition as an 
opportunity to publicly present militants as exactly what they are—politicized violent extremists 
taking advantage of people, especially children). 
The United States’ home-grown Violent Extremists and global VEs have some common 
denominators. Lacking direct ties to VE Organizations, they are inspired by radical websites 
calling for violence, and are connected via the internet to a transnational web of sympathizers. 
They are self-recruited, self-trained, and self-executing. “Experts cite cultural alienation, the 
influence of radical clerics, and even youthful rebellion run amok as motivations for these plots 
and misadventures. But what ties many of them together is the idea of defending a religion under 
attack.”[17] This is a localized example of the challenge facing the United States and the West 
world-wide, wherein local issues morph into a global problem. 
Psycho-Social Factors and Other Motivations 
Turmoil combined with acute feelings of injustice or disrespect on the part of authority figures in 
the Middle East and South Central Asia creates young adults who experience traumatic 
bereavement, outrage and a sense of powerlessness, and their normal developmental cycle does 
not occur. They are in the phase of what psychoanalysts call “prolonged adolescence”—a state in 
which a person is vulnerable to cult-like influence. Upon occasion, VE lieutenants recruit orphans, 
the fatherless, and refugees (such as Pakistani Taliban recruiting in madrassas and refugee 
camps), offering them a new “family” centered around Islam, occasionally targeting individuals for 
duty as suicide bombers. French scholar Gilles Kepel, author of Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 
warns that many of these children, raised on anger and fear, are potentially rebels without clear 
causes. “What will their jihads become?” he asks. “Are they going to grow up to kill each other, or 
will they turn their weapons against the West?”[18] Growing up in conflict leaves psychological 
scars and sometimes victims of violence may find themselves drawn into repeating the traumas 
of childhood. 
Cult Thinking and the Terrorist Threat 
Al-Qaeda can be considered a cult of martyrdom which is led by a malignant narcissist “Pied 
Piper” who wields charismatic power to influence idealistic, father-hungry and disillusioned young 
people toward destruction.[19] There is debate amongst psychology professionals as to whether 
Usama bin Laden should be considered a true psychopath or simply a true Muslim fanatic, and 
some argue that terror organizations such as al-Qaeda are too rational to be considered cults 
because they utilize acts of terror to support a political agenda.[20] Regardless, there are 
psychological characteristics of cults that apply to Violent Extremist Organizations and their 
members, al-Qaeda in particular. 
Most humans search for meaningful affiliation to build significance in our lives, but do not allow 
others, no matter how charismatic, to dominate our core values or decision-making—although all 
of us are susceptible to outside charismatic influences during certain times in our lives. Cult 
leaders and followers, however, often get psychologically “stuck” and fail to psychologically 
mature in a healthy way, thus fail to individuate properly. Some extremists are psychopaths; 
some are less individuated people. Others may simply be individuals searching for the meaning 
and a sense of belonging that comes with being part of a group with a righteous and idealistic 
mission. These are the ones that can be rehabilitated. 
People with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which characterizes many cult followers and VE 
“foot soldiers,” often have a need for admiration yet lack empathy for others, have a grandiose 
sense of importance, are preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success and power, believe that 
they are “special” and unique and can only be understood by other similarly “special” people, and 
take advantage of others to achieve their own ends. Thus, a first indicator of malignant behavior 
which could lead to violent activity is devaluation of outsiders—the “Other”—who is identified as 
damned, inferior, or bad. In al-Qaeda’s case the Christians, Jews and the United States are 
clearly identified as the “Other,” the enemy. 
The Malignant Narcissists, the “Pied Pipers,” have a rage involving loss of contact with reality and 
a desire to punish external enemies, chronic self-destructiveness or suicidal behavior, major and 
minor dishonesty (which is considered by some professionals to be psychopathy) linked in with 
manipulation and exploitation of others for personal profit, and a grandiosity with overt efforts to 
triumph over all authority. “Grandiosity and self-pedestalization are reinforced by the sense of 
triumph over fear and pain through inflicting pain on others” which allows them “a sense of 
superiority and triumph over life and death through their own suffering and that of their chosen 
followers and victims.”[21] In sum, they use their followers. 
Those prone to be attracted to cult-like groups tend to see things in very black and white ways, 
just as do engineers and those who are religious fundamentalists. Diego Gambetta and Steffen 
Hertog of the University of Oxford found via analysis of Violent Extremist case studies, that 
engineers are “strongly over-represented” among university educated VEs. 44 percent of those 
with known degrees were in engineering, while 14 percent were in medicine and 12 percent were 
in science.[22] The engineering mindset, they found, lent itself toward more extreme conservative 
and religious positions, from terrorist groups to extreme right wing movements in Germany. Such 
inclinations combined with “the emergence of Islamism as the only credible political opposition to 
authoritarian and corrupt establishments” appears to have led to radicalization as well as the 
aforementioned lack of professional opportunities, a feeling of relative deprivation and frustrated 
expectations. 
Indeed, there are many recruits who are not psychologically aberrant people, but rather those 
who feel a fairly justifiable rage when their legitimate aspirations are thwarted. This is especially 
true when aspirations are perceived to be thwarted by powerful elites who are hypocritical. These 
elites claim to be acting in the name of righteous values and in the interest of the people while 
their own population feels that they are living under intolerable conditions, under poor governance, 
and thus rebel against what they perceive as injustice. 
Psycho-Social Factors 
In conflict zones there is often a combination of unmet psychological needs, with ideology 
functioning as a type of psychological first aid. Where there is a sense of a foreshortened future, 
traumatic bereavement, depression, hopelessness, or frustration, a religious war offers many 
psychological benefits. “To live in a state of war is to live in a world in which individuals know who 
they are, why they have suffered, by whose hand they have been humiliated…”[23] 
Individuals who endure trauma may undergo dissociation, or a state of already being dead. This 
type of mental freezing can lead to consideration of suicide as an “out” in life, other than simply 
fight or flight, or can lead the individual to become unemotional about killing another human being. 
Those generations who see or experience war, torture and other horrors eventually normalize 
violent acts in their minds, a phenomenon from which a society may require a generation to 
recover. These people find it much easier to become a terrorist or a suicide bomber. 
“Fundamentalist mentality is more prevalent and … more readily embraced at times of severe 
social turmoil, rapid social change, economic hardship and oppression of minority groups.”  
–“Malignant Pied Pipers of Our Time” by Peter A. Olsson, M.D., 2005  
A community will embrace terrorism when it feels under threat, less optimistic, and when there is 
no trust in the political process. Tribal or sectarian support for Violent Extremist activity increases 
the potential pool of recruits. 
Violent Extremist Organizations provide a sense of “family” and an ideology which is the glue that 
holds the followers together.[24] Individuals look to their communities for a sense of self and 
identity and will not act in a manner that their community or group will not condone, thus such 
organizations establish a link between the ideal outcome and rule-following behavior (i.e. group 
norms and socialization)—the purpose of this Violent Extremist culture is to sustain it. In order to 
confront this, it is necessary to replace the organization’s collective identity with a more healthy 
sense of belonging such as a sense of community. “What really matters to people is their 
individual and group realities and issues in front of them on a daily basis; where they live, the 
conditions, the reality of their own home, street, neighborhood, and surrounding towns and 
cities.”[25] Within communities, as a result of Muslim and tribal tradition, there is a strong 
collective orientation; community pressure is utilized to reinforce rule-following behavior. Thus, a 
positive focus on community and economic development where individuals serve others in a 




Many individuals are lured to violence as a response to perceived discrimination, or as a 
defensive measure when they feel persecuted. Identification with perceived victims, exacerbated 
by personal experiences and the memory of that trauma or loss or embarrassment may cause 
Violent Extremist recruits to find self-fulfillment in expressing the group’s anger, making an enemy 
suffer as they have suffered. 
Discussions of unfavorable U.S. actions such as at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and photos of Abu 
Ghraib prison have become recruiting tools for AQ. This phenomenon, perceived disrespect and 
violation of sacred values, unleashes violent responses such as those seen resultant from Danish 
republication of the Prophet Mohammed cartoons, and the murder of Theo van Gogh over his 
controversial film. 
Ideology 
Usama bin Laden and ideologues he follows promote the idea that Islam is under attack, which 
naturally propagates apocalyptic concerns. This ideology is spread using the internet, appealing 
to those who feel that Muslim pride has been hurt, or who consider the United States and their 
partners to be hypocrites. 
Ideological language is utilized to legitimize armed opposition based on grievances that are, in 
reality, secular. In some societies where avenues for secular dissent are sealed off, and where 
there is little historical tradition of secular “revolution,” manipulating these grievances so that they 
fit into an ideological prism legitimizes armed resistance. 
Revenge 
Conflict zones provide opportunities to inflame calls for trauma-driven revenge, something that is 
actually a culturally appropriate response in the Middle East. Cultural issues such as saving face, 
or codes of honor, can be distorted to justify Violent Extremist activity. Revenge can be sought for 
being detained, for family members’ deaths, for disrespect or failure to pay diyya (a culturally 
appropriate apologetic payment for transgressions), and so on. Even broader motives, such as 
defense of land, country and religion against perceived occupation and disenfranchisement, can 
be used to justify calls for revenge. 
Patriotism 
Especially in the case of insurgencies, Muslims join Violent Extremist groups in the name of 
nationalistic pride under occupation, especially in the face of what is perceived to be daily 
humiliation, frustrated aspirations, traumatic loss and hopelessness. These people hold a belief 
that violence can make a difference in their world as the enemy is defeated or injured. However, 
many times, a sense of nationalism is represented by ethnic pride which can also be malignant 
when it becomes sectarianism or leads to genocide. This is a situation where the development of 
a dehumanized “Other” as the enemy becomes a symptom of a larger problem.  
Financial Incentives 
In Pakistan, many of the “orphans” attending madrassas are there for economic reasons. Not 
orphans in the traditional Western sense of the word, these children are often one of many borne 
by their parents. Unable to support, feed and clothe their numerous progeny, parents will submit a 
child to a madrassa for the room and board. In Iraq you see individuals joining Violent Extremist 
efforts of insurgent or militia groups simply to make a buck: the Mahdi Army, for example, has 
pays good money to plant an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or otherwise somehow kill an 
American. In Afghanistan, where there is little that is sustainable in the legitimate economy, many 
individuals turn to bearing arms for the Taliban because it is perceived to be an honorable way to 
make a living.[26] 
Religious Incentives 
In Afghanistan as with much of the rest of the Muslim world, a martyr is believed to die with the 
keys to heaven in his hands, and to be granted the right of seventy of his family to join him there. 
This is believed implicitly, is taught in the madrassas in Pakistan from whence many VE recruits 
come, and serves as a powerful incentive for those who are able to make the leap—who can get 
past the hurdle and understand suicide as a form of martyrdom. Most Muslims do not condone 
suicide, nor perceive it as martyrdom, and there are Islamic precepts that counter this concept. 
Prestige 
Pakistani parents submit a child to madrassas not only for room, board and education, but he 
gets what is perceived by society as an honorable theological education. The parents can say 
that they have dedicated a child to Allah; by proving their devotion to God, they gain prestige in 
their community as true believers who are dedicated to Islam.[27] 
Sense of Purpose, Meaning, Identity 
Violent Extremist Organizations promise or provide a sense of purpose or meaning, and group 
identity in the face of what may otherwise be alienation. It is human nature to form groups, and as 
with gangs, VEOs provide a collective glorified path of rebellion and individualist expression 
which might be considered normal if it weren’t so violent. In addition to the aforementioned sense 
of community or belonging which provides identity, VEOs also provide a sense of adventure, 
heroism, means of achieving manhood, escape from one’s current situation, and an honorable 
exit from life. 
Women’s Unique Motivations 
A special constellation of motivations and roles apply to women. They historically have supported 
Violent Extremist efforts as they indoctrinate youth, operate web sites, fundraise, carry messages 
or money, encourage the men, and even offer themselves as “prizes” to jihadists via both formal 
and informal marriages. However, there is a recent female suicide bomber trend which 
demonstrates a three-fold increase from last year (2007). This may be in response to the cultural 
importance placed on the male child, in an effort to gain significance. Some have lost their 
husband and sons, thus have no material or financial support, and no reason to live. For others, 
rape, divorce, or marriage to someone the family disapproves of, such as a Christian or one from 
another sect, are outcast and feel a sense of cultural humiliation. For these women, the ability to 
be “cleansed” via martyrdom and to ensure her family also goes to heaven, to bring pride to the 
family, a return of honor, or even revenge are all strong motivators. 
U.S. Actions Which May Impact the Problem  
Successes and Opportunities for Replication 
Humanitarian Assistance   
Following the Pakistani earthquake, the United States provided disaster relief which was much 
appreciated by the populace. Immediately following those events, and even to this day, 
Pakistanis remember that it was the United States that aided the common man. Circumstances 
where children are assisted, such as orphans or those needing medical assistance, provide a 
positive image of U.S. charity to the Muslim populations. 
Reconstruction and Development Assistance 
It is commonly acknowledged by individuals working with NGOs on the ground in Afghanistan and 
Iraq[28] that the U.S. Military can be counted on to provide development assistance. However, 
upon occasion, it is not carried out as well as it could be. There appears to be a disconnect 
between intent and execution. Education, health, security, energy and alternative livelihood 
programs all set the stage for positive progress that eliminates the fertile ground in which the 
seed of extremist ideology can grow. Whether development projects are compromised, and how 
the projects are carried out, are other matters of concern. In Afghanistan, Taliban commanders 
have won USAID funded contracts; this ends up financing U.S. enemies, but the Taliban are 
perceived by a portion of the population as legitimate actors who work toward the best interest of 
the people. Assistance provided by repudiated government channels is seen by some as 
reinforcing a very corrupt system (the Government of Afghanistan—GoA) that the people are 
angry about, and in such cases GoA involvement can be counter-productive. Thus, such 
assistance must be carried out with caution, and consideration to indirect support mechanisms. 
Continued U.S. pressure on such governments to eliminate corruption should be publicized 
amongst the subject populace. 
 
Democratic Values 
As stated earlier, the 2005-2006 Gallup Poll found that the “politically radicalized” were more 
likely than mainstream Muslims to say that “moving toward greater democracy will help 
Arab/Muslim societies’ progress,” possibly indicating a generalized, underlying desire for greater 
self-determination in all aspects of their life. There are, in fact, values and principles which also 
happen to be democratic that both religions share, and tribes operate democratically. Such 
similarities should be capitalized upon and used to build a bridge to the Muslim world. 
Current U.S. policies related to spread of democracy are rejected in the region on a number of 
grounds including a perception that Middle Eastern attempts at democracy have been a failure, 
and cynicism regarding the true value of, and intentions of, USG efforts at promoting “democracy” 
(versus promoting “democratic values”). For some of the region’s population, there is a cognitive 
dissonance as they question and reject perceived U.S. imposition of “democracy” but at the same 
time they aspire to increased participation in the collective destiny of their own society. The 
concept of “democracy” also is rejected due to a perception that U.S.-style democracy does not 
include justice, something revered within Islam, but only individual freedom, something that is 
viewed as anathema to Muslims.[29] This is a descriptive in USG official communications and 
rhetoric that must change, as an image is being portrayed which is different than intended. 
A difficult solution to these problems boils down to communication combined with action. The 
United States could begin communicating with the Muslim world about shared values and 
principles that also happen to be democratic, and discuss issues that both religions share, such 
as respect for justice. The United States must furthermore better deliver on the concepts that it 
promotes. Rather than talking about “democracy,” we must start to represent democratic values 
by our actions and example, and via the figures in the world that we promote or support. The 
USG should be clear that we are not seeking to export Jeffersonian democracy to the Middle East, 
but rather to promote values and principles such as justice and human rights while supporting 
local governments to develop systems that truly allow the peoples’ voice to be heard. 
Successful Examples of Reform and De-Radicalization 
Unlike committed terrorists, who must be deterred, intercepted, imprisoned, destroyed, many VEs 
can be reformed. De-radicalization programs are designed to persuade VEs to abandon the use 
of violence, moderate individuals’ ideology, or create an environment that discourages growth of 
radical movements by addressing the basic issues fueling them. Those who can be reformed are 
clearly not ideologically committed, and motivations for joining Violent Extremist Organizations 
and motivations to reform or de-radicalize seem to vary by state. 
Various countries’ programs have had dubious results, so it would be worth analyzing the fullness 
to identify the veracity of their conclusions and whether such programs would be worth replicating. 
It would be an opportunity to identify best practices in order to incorporate them into one 
comprehensive program. Also, in none of the countries is there a primary focus on a core 
problem: disenfranchisement of the individual who becomes a Violent Extremist. 
• Indonesia: Indonesia’s anti-terrorism police have begun using ex-militants as a vanguard 
for change within their own communities. They argue against violence and have 
succeeded in persuading over two dozen former Jemaah Islamiah (JI) members and 
those of other VE organizations to work with the police. For example, Nasir Abas, a 
former JI leader, now works to persuade former comrades against violence. He uses both 
theological bases and strategic arguments that not all Westerners are anti-Muslim. He 
asks them whether terrorist bombs have made people respect Islam. In many countries, 
mainstream Muslim clerics are in a position where they must do most of the persuading 
but they run the risk of being seen as puppets of their government, so this is an 
alternative method of communicating moderation through an individual perceived to be 
legitimate. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has analyzed the success of this initiative, 
and found that economic aid to families is ultimately more important than religious 
arguments in changing prisoner attitudes. ICG recommends this program be incorporated 
into a broader program of prison reform to eliminate corruption and opportunities for hard-
line radicals to recruit ordinary criminals to the cause.  
• Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia has established a program to reform and re-educate former 
terrorists which has been largely, although not completely, successful. It would be 
appropriate to analyze how and why it has been effective, or not, and whether such 
concepts and programs could be mirrored elsewhere. The Saudis take care of family 
members while the radical is imprisoned, the VE engages in dialogue with religious 
clerics regarding Islamic precepts on violence, and psychiatrists/psychologists treat the 
radicals. It has been successful with people who for some reason were led to buy into the 
propaganda but has reportedly not succeeded with true believers. The state exercises 
extreme control over the reformed VE within society after his release, and provide 
material rewards for turning from violence such as a car, wife, and a job.  
• Other Countries:  
o Singapore—Modeled after Malaysia’s program, the state works with radicals’ 
families, provides jobs to the reformed and they are closely monitored upon 
release.  
o UK—Scotland Yard has an effort wherein psychological motivations and 
vulnerabilities are identified. They work with new militant converts who have poor 
knowledge of Qur’an, introduce them to critical thinking about religious principles 
and teach them how to critique what they have been taught.  
o U.S./Iraq—The detainee rehabilitation program addresses motivations, utilizes 
clerical discussions on Islam to counter VE ideology and correct radical’s 
understanding of Islam. They also use psychological assistance to help 
overcome trauma, address desires for revenge or to counter sectarianism.  
o Yemen—Committee for Dialogue (CfD) was established Aug 2002, a 
Presidential initiative led by Hamoud Abdulhameed al Hittar. It operates with 
popular support, and its purpose is to reform detained radicals. It appears to 
have had dubious results and should be evaluated for lessons learned.  
o Malaysia—Dubious results are achieved as radicals are allegedly motivated to 
“reform” because they get beatings if they do not claim to agree with the new 
religious teachings. They are surveilled upon release. Nonetheless there may be 
lessons to learn.  
Potential Problems and Opportunities to Improve 
Problematic partnerships. The United States has a history of seeking partners that are perceived 
in the region, and the international community, as authoritarian, dictatorial, exploitative, or 
repressive (Mubarak in Egypt, King Saud in Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the 1980s, 
The Shah of Iran in the 70s), an issue that fosters anti-American sentiment.  
 
Creating Frankenstein   
The Taliban, and Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, are linked to U.S. involvement and influence in 
the region, as well as that of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It is critical that the USG remain 
cognizant to the risk of enabling groups or movements in the region, and that the USG remember 
the short term nature of alliances born there to overcome immediate problems or issues; as the 
saying goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” In other words, an alliance or partnership 
with the United States to overcome a problem will not necessarily cause a country to remain a 
U.S. ally or partner long term. Execution of U.S. foreign policy has led to blowback in more than 
one occasion, thus such relationships should be carefully considered. 
The Crux of the Problem for many Arabs and Muslims 
No treatise on USCENTCOM AOR problems can go without mention of the Arab-Israeli crisis, but 
not all people in all countries are truly concerned with the issue. Although not even on the radar 
screen for many, to a large extent it is a pretext for anti-U.S. sentiment and is used by Violent 
Extremist Organizations as a call to action. 
What it represents to many, and how it is used as a negative factor in the enemy Strategic 
Communications campaigns, is what makes it worth discussion. It is essential to understand the 
wide spread perception in the region that the United States has not been a neutral, just, impartial 
or fair party with regard to its foreign policy. The United States is perceived as hypocritical 
because it preaches human rights to global actors such as Iran or China or Burma, while 
supporting Israel which is widely perceived to be carrying out rights violations in the occupied 
territories. Meanwhile detainees are held at Guantanamo Bay for years with what is perceived to 
be a paucity of rights, in violation of international law. These are situations that fuel anger against 
the United States, enabling anti-U.S. actors of all types and giving them propaganda material. For 
example, UBL’s message on 20 March 2008 urged Muslims to support the insurgency in Iraq as 
the best way to support the Palestinians, and accused Arab leaders of backing Israeli attacks on 
the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. 
What to Do About Violent Extremists 
The first step toward deterring Violent Extremist Organizations’ ascendancy is to understand the 
individuals involved. Thus, it is essential to identify different populations and their varied 
motivations, religious ideological, political or personal. Toward this end, some ideas below 
recommend further areas for evaluation and analysis to enable better decision-making on both a 
tactical and strategic level. 
Al-Qaeda is a totalitarian political organization that executes terrorist acts, and often its network 
franchises also conduct illegitimate criminal acts. AQ Senior Leadership (AQSL) mis-utilizes 
religion as a political tool, and the result is harm to innocent civilians across the globe. In the end, 
the problem of jihad is a Muslim one—one which requires Muslim solutions[30]—but there are 
things that the United States can do to shape the environment, deter spread of violent extremism, 
prevent radicalization, and influence via ideology management. 
State-to-State Influence Opportunities  
Help U.S. partners understand it is in their best interest to increase counter-extremism efforts 
domestically, and offer to provide assistance overtly, covertly and/or indirectly. Be prepared to 
exploit and capitalize on al-Qaeda tactical failures and mistakes immediately when they occur, 
through support to partner states. 
Assist regional states in both countering extremism where there is no evident self interest, while 
helping them understand why they should do so. Foreign Military Sales (FMS), funding, etc could 
be leveraged and identified as support in exchange for cooperation in reducing both extremist 
activity and radicalizing education. Unless something is done about madrassas and mosque 
psycho-social manipulation, this grooming process will lead directly to an increase in future 
generations that are anti-U.S. There may be an opportunity to indirectly support independently 
funded NGOs that provide civil assistance, such as secular education in vulnerable areas of 
Pakistan that provides an alternative to more radical madrassas. 
Pressure regional partner states to prevent Violent Extremist financial support and recruitment 
amongst constituents. Saudi Arabia provides a tremendous human resource opportunity for AQ, 
and many VEO supporters there who are not ready or able to take action provide financial 
support for the cause. It makes a good case study of what went wrong, and some steps to 
remedy the situation. There and in Pakistan, not only revision of educational curriculum and texts 
but also review of religious fatwas by Muslim marja, and limits imposed on media could lead to a 
reduction of extremism, which would ultimately be expressed as a reduction in the number of 
foreign fighters and in financial contributions to jihadist organizations. 
Media in places such as Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia have articles in government supported 
media that call for extermination of Americans and Jews. Those governments may find it useful to 
stimulate such wrath in order to direct popular anger of disenfranchised constituents away from 
themselves. The United States should use leverage to encourage those countries to minimize or 
eliminate such propaganda, and at the same time encourage the leaders to address the problems 
causing so much political opposition. 
Continue to urge partner governments to do more to tackle corruption within their governments, 
and to counter narcotics. The United States and coalition is creating conditions for development 
of secure and stable environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, but the rule of law and 
government transparency are necessary for that security and stability to solidify. Additionally, 
narcotics is an increasingly destabilizing element that affects commerce, governance, 
development, security, and enables the enemy, especially the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Security or Development Opportunities 
Focus on professionalizing partner military and security forces to enable them to support their 
state government. 
Increase efforts to build partner state Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
capabilities. Military support for good governance, achieved via SSTR activities, is an effective 
tool to create an environment counter to that which breeds Violent Extremists. A positive focus on 
community and economic development where individuals serve others in a visibly constructive 
way with tangible results is an opportunity to counter malignant lures of VE Organizations. 
Increase Peacekeeping and Stability Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to minimize 
unstable conditions which make youth (and adults) susceptible to influence of VEs. Expedite 
deployment and activation of PRTs, work with the interagency to make these efforts more 
efficient and cogent. Most importantly, use military leverage to back up diplomatic efforts toward 
improving good governance capabilities of the very people the United States ushered into power. 
Increase emphasis on sustainable job development and alternative livelihood programs. This 
would provide a means for individuals to support their family, thus saving face and allowing the 
adults to have pride that is culturally important. Opportunities may exist to provide sustainable 
jobs via labor intensive infrastructure projects that include on-the-job skill development, thus 
providing skills that can be utilized toward commerce, improving the economy in the future (once 
the United States is no longer involved). 
Encourage profit, pride and purpose. Persons who are vulnerable to Violent Extremist 
Organization’s recruitment are: individuals searching for meaning and a sense of belonging that 
comes with being part of a group with a righteous and idealistic mission, individuals who currently 
feel disenfranchised due to the governance situation in their state, those who are fighting back 
against a dominant society they perceive “mistreats” them, and those who join the fight in order to 
earn a living. USCENTCOM could further analyze successful prevention, rehabilitation and de-
radicalization programs to identify opportunities to support such programs in the AOR. One 
alternative for VE rehabilitation may be to teach them other skills, and develop programs such as 
the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) or the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) groups of Iraq in 
which they feel honored, respected, enjoy a sense of esprit de corps and discipline, and earn a 
living wage that allows them to support their families. 
The Commander on the ground is at the crux of prevention, through Rules Of Engagement (ROE), 
understanding of the U.S. footprint and its impact, local customs and context, and an 
understanding of the enemy. Both Combatant and Operational Commanders can ensure 
operations are conducted in a way that will not alienate the VEO’s target support and recruitment 
population, pushing them toward extremism (avoidance of human rights violations, or accusations 
thereof, for torture or roughing up detainees, events like Abu Ghraib, unnecessary door-kicking, 
fighting via counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism methods vice conventional, ensuring legal 
compliance at places such as GITMO). It’s not just about Abu Ghraib, it’s about the way that 
convoys drive, it’s landing helicopters in wheat fields, it’s drive-by shootings of civilians that are 
not followed up and investigated or compensated. It is the U.S. posture in these spaces.[31] As a 
result of the “surge” in Iraq, and the corresponding operational and tactical changes toward 
asymmetrical methods and counterinsurgency doctrine, Coalition Forces have made significant 
progress. The surge also demonstrated that consistent efforts by U.S. forces will pay off over time. 
There is also a role to be played by commanders on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 
holding local leadership accountable to their populations. Many do not consider these 
governments to be truly representative. The United States has helped bring these governments 
and leaders to power, and the people feel the United States has a responsibility to hold those 
local leaders’ feet to the fire in terms of responsive behavior. Military leaders can do this much 
better than the civilians, although this should be conducted via close collaboration with DoS and 
knowledgeable civilians, because in the AOR raw power is still more respected than the lone 
governance officer.[32] 
U.S. Foreign Policy 
Seek out and indirectly enable genuinely moderate and legitimate Muslim leaders that intervene 
and counter extremist ideology, and consider enabling more scrupulous regimes. Muslim religious 
authorities who confront abuse of religious doctrine, highlighting actions that violate the moral 
principles, will be more effective than any message sent by the United States or the West and will 
be effective as long as the United States avoids being directly linked to them. The USG could 
also consider alternatives to key partners in various states and reevaluate their strategic value 
(such as historic U.S. support for Musharraf which could in the end cause an anti-U.S. backlash 
within Pakistan).  
Until “the U.S. is our enemy” image is dispelled, Violent Extremist Organizations will continue to 
have a recruiting tool amongst their laborer group. Thus, one significant issue to consider is the 
effect of visible support to figures of perceived repression in the region. Support to perceived 
unbearable governments, political leaders, military leaders, etc does lend some popular credence 
to our enemy’s arguments that the United States is an enemy to the people. Historic U.S. 
orientation toward stability has led to support for autocrats or dictators, which has the potential of 
driving people into the arms of the violent opposition, so this factor must be considered when 
aiming for good governance. 
It is critical that the USG remain cognizant to the risk of enabling groups or movements in the 
region, and remember the short-term nature of alliances born there to overcome immediate 
problems or issues. 
Strategic Communications   
Any Western efforts to enter the theological domain are likely to fail unless carried out by 
Muslims , and even then it should be only in support, indirectly or even covertly, to legitimately 
perceived Islamic or political authorities in the region. 
Destroy the narrative —how al-Qaeda and Shi’ia VEOs have framed the struggle. Expose the fact 
that the foot soldiers are being used by UBL and other VEO senior leaders for political purposes, 
and to gain power, may be an effective wake up call to diminish their power. 
Demonstrate how Violent Extremist activity can be practically detrimental to an individual’s or a 
community’s goals (tribe, clan, family) or could lead to demise of their own country . In Pakistan, 
for example, tribal elders are realizing that the Taliban and AQ are killing innocents, and wreaking 
havoc on the local population in the name of Islam. They consider the new generation of Taliban 
to be more violent than the founders, and are concerned that the way of life will change as a 
result of such activity. 
The United States could begin communicating with the Muslim world about shared values and 
principles which also happen to be democratic, and discuss issues that both religions share, such 
as respect for justice. The United States must furthermore better deliver on the concepts that it 
promotes. The 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project found that publics in predominantly Muslim 
countries believe that democracy can work in their countries. However, if U.S. partners in these 
countries are actually undermining justice, discussion about promoting “democracy” rings hollow 
and the population becomes cynical about U.S. intentions. The USG should embrace Arabs and 
Muslims who promote governmental accountability, democratic values, and basic human rights 
and could consider sanctioning those partners that undermine our values. Rather than talking 
about “democracy,” we must start to represent democratic values by our actions and example, 
and via the figures in the AOR that we promote or support. The USG should be clear that we are 
not seeking to export Jeffersonian democracy to the Middle East, but rather to promote values 
and principles such as justice and human rights while supporting local governments to develop 
systems that truly allow the peoples’ voice to be heard. 
Media amplification could either reinforce the perceived validity of the Violent Extremist 
Organization’s goals, or it could be turned into a moral and ethical detractor from the cause if 
mainstream Muslim populations see these acts of terror as anti-Muslim. Such acts can be 
juxtaposed against precepts such as Sura 5:32.[33] 
Cultivate and support independent local news media. VEOs make use of censorship, selection, 
omission, and propaganda such as that from Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to raise 
resentment and suspicion amongst the populace. In contrast, the USG/USCENTCOM could 
support forces in the AOR that are trying to create modern independent, pluralistic, objective 
media based on Western-style objective journalism[34] which implies tolerance for criticism of the 
government. Most times, local voices will reverberate with the populace with much more 
resonance than any artificially contrived Western attempt at countering AQ propaganda. 
Be prepared to undermine VEO recruitment. This can be problematic when there are situations 
without substance, or with challenges, such as in Afghanistan where some of the populace 
perceives that it suffers more at the hands of the GoA which is USG-supported than it does at the 
hands of the Taliban. 
Expose fantasies about suicide bombers the fact that killing of innocent civilians is un-Islamic. 
Killing of women and children was explicitly forbidden by Mohammed. Air “confessions” of foiled 
bombers who claim that they did not know that they were about to engage in a suicide operation, 
because someone else was in control of the detonator while they thought they were merely 
delivering the truck to the target, stories about those who had their hands handcuffed to the 
steering wheel, and others who were given drugs and shown pornographic materials to excite 
them into meeting heavenly maidens. Defeat means to rationalize Violent Extremist activity. 
Give Muslims another message, addressing the “grey areas” (versus black and white—try to 
counter black and white concepts about Islam while appealing to the fundamentalist mindset that 
considers concepts in such terms). Provide alternative views so that young Muslims can decide 
for themselves, and can hear the other Muslim perspectives, not just the UBL version of Islam 
and jihad. One example is Egyptian Sayyed Imam al Sharif (aka “Dr. Fadl”), formerly one of the 
chief ideologues of the global totalitarian movement, who published in 2007 “The Document of 
Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World.” He refutes UBL’s message and jihadist 
propaganda and argues that AQ originated essentially as mercenaries, as al Zawahiri was 
commissioned by the Sudanese government to carry out terror attacks in Egypt in the 1990s. He 
also argues that there are both “practical” and shari’a reasons not to engage in clashes in which 
AQ engaged. He claims that AQ followers commit grave violations in the name of jihad almost 
daily in Iraq, influenced by “deviant programs” of AQ. 
Provide means to disseminate already existing, and future incidents, of Fatwas and statements 
by respected Muslim leaders which counter VE ideas. 
The militants have used children for fighting and for propaganda purposes, even releasing a 
video showing a very young looking boy hacking off the head of a hostage. The horrific use of 
children presents itself to the United States and coalition as an opportunity to inform the world 
about how horrific the VEs are. Al-Qaeda/UBL use their followers, something which if pointed out, 
could be a gain. 
Continued pressure on regional governments to eliminate corruption should be publicized 
amongst the subject populace, using public diplomacy to ensure people in the region realize that 
the USG is attempting to help make their situation better. 
Portray jihadists as “deviants” and misguided individuals who know little about Islam and have 
been brainwashed into carrying out suicide attacks. 
Air religious discussions about “wrong motivations” of so-called jihadists, and that one cannot 
receive the rewards of martyrdom if he or she is, in reality, motivated by something other than 
love of God and striving in His path. 
Capitalize on and exploit AQ vulnerabilities. USCENTCOM must be prepared to exploit and 
capitalize on AQ tactical failures and mistakes when they occur. If possible, find a way to force 
AQ to repeat their mistakes, or even publicize as if they did. This will require immediate reaction, 
and careful analysis of the situation to identify signs that AQ is losing ground, such as seen 
previously in al Anbar Province. These are ways that the United States can help Islam correct 
itself, but it is necessary to highlight these cases/issues in a non-offensive manner as the United 
States offers assistance to elements such as the Awakening Councils. 
The 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project found that while support for suicide bombings and other 
terrorist acts has fallen in most Muslim-majority countries surveyed, so too has confidence in Al-
Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden. This provides an opportunity to delegitimize UBL and reveals a 
strategic weakness for AQ recruiting. 
There are different paths being taken by the old guard and the current generation. Thus far it has 
not caused an open rupture, but it may be possible to drive a wedge between the two and 
weaken the movement. There is currently a revolt against the “establishment” upon which 
USCENTCOM may be able to build. 
The “homegrown resistance” and insurgents do not necessarily trust those they consider to be 
“foreigners.” Means of prevention for local recruitment… go back into psycho-social/cultural or 
political rationale, or show difference/gap between the “establishment” and the “rebels”… M 
embers and persons close to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s most prominent extremist 
organization, have developed a publishing consortium, something which at first appears to be a 
negative issue for the West. However, a close examination of the titles printed indicates an 
internal debate within JI over the desirability of al-Qaeda tactics which seems to be taking place 
spontaneously, without any assistance from the government “de-radicalization” program, 
according to ICG. 
Identify situations where al-Qaeda franchises “have been given enough rope to hang themselves” 
where heavy handedness, attempts to force their version of shari’a law upon the populace, and 
attempts to supersede local customs may very well lead the populations to turn against them. Be 
prepared to capitalize upon such tactical failures when they occur.  
Local AQ franchise leaders often act in ways that are un-Islamic, which takes away legitimacy 
from the organization, thus support from the populace, leading to a general decline in support for 
AQ. In some cases they have isolated themselves from the masses. 
Al-Qaeda fatigue is a real factor. There is already a push-back against extremists from other 
Muslims (al Anbar Province in Iraq is one example, and the conditions for this may be brewing in 
parts of Pakistan). It would be advisable for the USG to assist in creation of a broader 
environment where the extremists might maintain their repulsive ideology but are inhibited from 
actually following through with their extremist prescriptions by social mores.  
De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation 
Analysis of de-radicalization cases may further identify individual motivations that led to extremist 
activity. USCENTCOM should further analyze de-radicalization programs to determine viable 
findings—results seem to indicate that economic aid to families is ultimately more important than 
religious arguments in changing attitudes of former VEs. This indicates that economic salience, 
and quality of life for one’s family may be more important than theology and thus supports military 
support to SSTR. Creation of paths to durable economic self sufficiency would likely be helpful, 
and means to support this should be further evaluated. Of specific concern is the question of what 
to do with them once they are reformed. 
Spiritual commitment to the jihad is critical, as individuals with such commitment cannot be de-
radicalized or rehabilitated. A question worth analysis is how to identify the “tipping point” where 
an individual who joined the VE movement for personal reasons becomes sufficiently 
indoctrinated and truly buys into the rhetoric. Even rehabilitable VEs may truly buy into the 
rhetoric, but might be won back by changes in their secular conditions or counter arguments that 
are ideologically orthodox alternatives. These tipping points will be different in different societies. 
Many VEO recruits are Muslims who do not know the Qur’an and cannot judge for themselves the 
validity of what they are being taught by those radicalizing them, and who take suras out of 
context. 
Understanding why and how the individual becomes motivated to pick up arms and act out 
violently, outside of irreconcilable religious motivation, will allow the USG to identify means to 
seize opportunities to exploit VE differences and leverage AQ vulnerabilities, widen gaps or drive 
a wedge between violent extremists and their potential recruits, and impede extremist efforts to 
gain collective momentum in their overall global totalitarian efforts. Part of the solution to the 
problem resides in understanding, and helping substantively redress, legitimate grievances or 
problems faced by the population from which recruits are drawn. Only generational transformation 
can end the conflict. 
Summary 
The generation growing up in the Middle East since the early 1990s largely knows and perceives 
the United States as an occupier, and regional media perpetuates that image. U.S. credibility is 
tainted. Thus, it should be a goal to provide indirect support to Muslim leaders and countries 
when they find themselves countering violent extremism domestically, supporting democratic 
values, and acting in a way that serves the interest of their constituents. When there is a direct 
threat to U.S. interests, the United States may feel obliged to act unilaterally. However, to the 
greatest extent possible, public perception in the region and the world should be that it is the host 
country’s responsibility—and the host country’s actions—that directly counter Violent Extremists. 
When regional states or sub-communities find that it is in their interests to counter Violent 
Extremists, the United States and USCENTCOM should do what they can to enable better 
execution.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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